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TAXATION
Craig D. Bell *
INTRODUCTION
This article reviews significant recent developments in the
laws affecting Virginia taxation. Each section covers legislative
changes, judicial decisions, and selected opinions or pronounce-
ments from the Virginia Department of Taxation (the "Tax De-
partment") and the Virginia Attorney General over the past year.
Part I of this article addresses legislative changes and judicial
decisions made to Virginia corporate and individual income tax
law. Part II covers legal changes pertaining to retail sales and
use taxes.
Parts III and IV address changes to the law in Virginia regard-
ing real and personal property taxes. Part V addresses legislative
changes and an official opinion from the Virginia Attorney Gen-
eral addressing miscellaneous local taxes. Part VI addresses leg-
islative changes and judicial decisions made to the Business Pro-
fessional and Occupational License ("BPOL") Tax.
* Partner, McGuireWoods LLP, Richmond, Virginia. LL.M., 1986, Marshall-Wythe
School of Law, College of William & Mary; J.D., 1983, State University of New York at
Buffalo; M.B.A., 1980, Syracuse University; B.S., 1979, Syracuse University. Mr. Bell,
chair of the McGuireWoods Tax and Employee Benefits Department, practices primarily
in the areas of state and local taxation, and civil and criminal tax litigation. He is a Fellow
of the American College of Tax Counsel, a Fellow of the Virginia Law Foundation, a Fellow
of the American Bar Foundation, a Barrister of the J. Edgar Murdock Inn of Court (United
States Tax Court), an adjunct professor of tax law at the College of William & Mary School
of Law, and a past chair of both the Tax and Military Law sections of the Virginia State
Bar and the Tax Section of the Virginia Bar Association. Mr. Bell is an emeritus director
of The Community Tax Law Project, a nonprofit pro bono provider of tax law services for
the working poor, and is its recipient of the Lifetime Pro Bono Achievement Award for his
pro bono work in representing hundreds of Virginians before the IRS and in United States
Tax Court and federal district court, as well as developing and training many lawyers in
the area of federal tax law to expand pro bono tax representation for low-income taxpay-
ers.
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The overall purpose of this article is to provide Virginia tax and
general practitioners with a concise overview of the recent devel-
opments in Virginia taxation that will most likely impact them.
However, this article does not discuss many of the numerous
technical legislative changes to Title 58.1 of the Virginia Code
which covers taxation.
I. TAXES ADMINISTERED BY THE TAX DEPARTMENT
A. Recent Significant Legislative Activity
1. Fixed Date of Conformity
The 2014 Virginia General Assembly amended Virginia Code
section 58.1-301, which mandates conformity with the terms of
the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"), to advance Virginia's fixed
date of conformity from January 1, 2013 to January 1, 2018.' Vir-
ginia continues to disallow the federal bonus depreciation deduc-
tions allowed under IRC § 168(k), but allows any bonus deprecia-
tion permitted under § 168(n), "which is designed to benefit
qualified disaster assistance property."2 Virginia law also contin-
ues to disallow the income tax deductions related to applicable
high yield discount obligations under IRC § 163(e)(5)(F) and the
deferral of income from the debt cancellation under IRC § 108(i),
for taxable year 2014 and future taxable years. The legislation
extends Virginia's conformity to the federal enhanced earned in-
come tax credit under IRC § 32(b)(3) for taxable years 2013
through 2017.
1. Act of Feb. 5, 2014, ch. 1, 2014 Va. Acts -, (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-301 (Supp. 2014)); Act of Feb. 20, 2014, ch. 2, 2014 Va. Acts _, - (codified
as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-301 (Supp. 2014)); see VA. DEP'T OF TAXATION, PUB.
Doc. 14-1 (Feb. 20, 2014), available at www.policylibrary.tax.virginia.gov/OTP/policy.nsf
(follow 'Tax Bulletins" hyperlink; then follow "2014" hyperlink; then follow "VTB14-1 (PD
14-18)" hyperlink) [hereinafter TAX BULL. 14-1].
2. Craig D. Bell, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Taxation, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 169,
170 (2013); see VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-301(B)(1) (Supp. 2014); TAX BULL. 14-1, supra note 1.
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-301(B)(3)-(4) (Supp. 2014); TAX BULL. 14-1, supra note 1.
4. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-301(B)(6) (Supp. 2014).
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2. Intangible Holding Company Additions
In a special session of the 2014 General Assembly, the Virginia
legislature amended the Appropriations Act for the 2012-2014
biennium and added a retroactive interpretation in Virginia Code
section 3-5.11 of this budget legislation to the intangible holding
company additions and addbacks located in section 58.1-
402(B)(8). The retroactive interpretations in this budget bill leg-
islation concern two exceptions to the addback requirement. Sec-
tion 58.1-402(B)(8)(a) codifies the two exceptions as follows:
(1) The corresponding item of income received by the related member
is subject to a tax based on or measured by net income or capital im-
posed by Virginia, another state, or a foreign government that has
entered into a comprehensive tax treaty with the United States gov-
ernment;
(2) The related member derives at least one-third of its gross reve-
nues from the licensing of intangible property to parties who are not
related members, and the transaction giving rise to the expenses and
costs between the corporation and the related member was made at
rates and terms comparable to the rates and terms of agreements
that the related member has entered into with parties who are not
related members for the licensing of intangible property.
With regard to these two exceptions, the budget bill states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 58.1-402(B)(8), Code of
Virginia, for taxable years beginning on and after January 1, 2004:
(i) The exception in § 58.1-402(B)(8)(a)(1) for income that is
subject to a tax based on or measured by net income or capital
imposed by Virginia, another state, or a foreign government
shall be limited and apply only to the portion of such income
received by the related member, which portion is attributed to
a state or foreign government in which the related member has
sufficient nexus to be subject to such taxes; and
(ii) The exception in § 58.1-402(B)(8)(a)(2) for a related member
deriving at least one-third of its gross revenues from licensing
to unrelated parties shall be limited and apply only to the por-
tion of such income derived from licensing agreements for
which the rates and terms are comparable to the rates and
terms of agreements that the related member has actually en-
tered into with unrelated entities.
5. Act of Apr. 1, 2014, ch.1, 2014 Va. Acts _, (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 3-5.11 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-402(B)(8)(a)(1)-(2) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
7. Ch. 1, 2014 Va. Acts _.
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In effect, the foregoing two exceptions reverse the Richmond
City Circuit Court's decision in Wendy's International, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia Department of Taxation, interpreting the second exception
of section 58.1-402(B)(8)(a)(2).' Since the enactment of the add-
back statute in 2004, the Tax Department has argued that only
the "portion" of income taxed in exception (i) or derived from li-
censing agreements in exception (ii) is eligible for the exception
and that this was the original intent of the legislative exceptions.
For example, in Public Document 07-153, the Virginia Tax Com-
missioner interpreted the addback exception requirement nar-
rowly stating that "[t]he exception is limited to the portion of the
taxpayer's royalty payments to its parent that correspond to the
portion of the parent's income subjected to tax in other states."0
The Tax Commissioner's reference to "the portion of the
[t]axpayer's royalty payments" does not appear in the statutory
exception language." Instead, the 2014 budget bill supplies this
missing language and makes the legislation retroactive to 2004,
the year the addback statute was enacted. 2 This legislation im-
pacts at least two pending Virginia court cases and presumably
numerous pending audits." This 2014 budget bill overcomes the
Tax Department's failure in the 2013 General Assembly to codify
its desired interpretation of the state.14 Furthermore, "hiding" the
retroactive language in the 2014 budget bill enabled the legisla-
ture to codify the Tax Department's litigation and simultaneously
to avoid the appropriate tax-writing committees and due consid-
eration. It also avoided debate over the issues and the implica-
tions that typically occur in a public setting. According to the
Council on State Taxation ("COST"), in a letter to the Virginia
8. 84 Va. Cir. 398, 399 (2012) (Richmond City); see Craig D. Bell, Annual Survey of
Virginia Law: Taxation, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 307, 315-18 (2012).
9. Wendy's, 84 Va. Cir. at 398-99.
10. See, e.g., VA. DEP'T OF TAXATION, PUB. Doc. 07-153 (Oct. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.policylibrary.tax.virginia.gov/OTP/policy.nsf (follow "rulings of the Tax Com-
missioner" hyperlink; then follow "2007" hyperlink; then click on "PDO7-153" hyperlink)
[hereinafter PUB. Doc. 07-153].
11. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-402(B)(8)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
12. Ch. 1, 2014 Va. Acts _.
13. The two pending cases are Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, No.
CL 13000509-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. filed July 22, 2013) (Danville City), and Kohl's Dep't Stores,
Inc. v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, No. CL 12001774-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. filed Apr. 16, 2012)
(Richmond City).
14. S.B. 1036, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2013).
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Senate and House Budget Conferees, "[t]he ten-year period of ap-
plication far exceeds the 'modest period of retroactivity' sanc-
tioned by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Carlton.""
3. Tax Credit for Research and Development Expenses Expanded
The 2014 General Assembly enacted legislation that provides
for several changes to the credit against Virginia corporate and
personal income tax for qualified research and development ex-
penses.1 First, the legislature increased the annual credit cap
from $5 million to $6 million, effective for fiscal years beginning
on or after July 1, 2014, and extended the sunset date by three
years, from December 31, 2015 to December 31, 2018." The legis-
lation also increased the amount of credit that each taxpayer can
claim to an amount
equal to ... 15 percent of the first $234,000 in Virginia qualified re-
search and development expenses paid or incurred by the taxpay-
er, .. . or 20 percent of the first $234,000 in Virginia qualified re-
search and development expenses paid or incurred by the taxpayer
... if the Virginia qualified research was conducted in conjunction
with a Virginia public or private college or university, to the extent
18
the expenses exceed the Virginia base amount for the taxpayer.
In the event that the total amount of credits is less than $6 mil-
lion for any taxable year, the statute requires the Tax Depart-
ment to "allocate credits up to the maximum of $6 million, on a
pro rata basis, to taxpayers who are already approved for the tax
credit" in an amount equal to 15% of the second $234,000 in Vir-
ginia qualified research and development expenses paid or in-
curred by the taxpayer, or 20% of the second $234,000 in such ex-
penses if the research was conducted in conjunction with a
Virginia college or university." The legislation also allows part-
15. Letter from Ferdinand S. Hogroian, Tax & Legislative Counsel, to Members of
Joint Conferee Comm. on the Budget 2 (Apr. 11, 2014) (citing United States v. Carlton,
512 U.S. 26 (1994)).
16. Act of Mar. 7, 2014, ch. 227, 2014 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-439.12:08 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
17. Id.
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.12:08 (Supp. 2014).
19. Ch. 227, 2014 Va. Acts _.
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nerships, limited liability companies, or electing S corporations to
choose to receive and claim the credit at the entity level."0
4. Interest Charged-Domestic International Sales Corporation
Exclusion from Tax Enacted
An Interest Charged-Domestic International Sales Corporation
("IC-DISC") is a tax-exempt entity that an export company may
form as part of a planning technique to lower its federal rate of
taxation on export income." Specifically, in this planning tech-
nique, an export company forms a corporation that elects to be an
IC-DISC. The export company then pays the IC-DISC commission
payments for services provided."" According to the Tax Depart-
ment's 2014 Fiscal Impact Statement:
[t]he amount of commission payments may not exceed the greater of
50 percent of the export company's net export income or 4 percent of
the export company's export sales revenue. The export company may
claim a deduction from ordinary income for the amount of the com-
mission payments.
The IC-DISC does not pay federal corporate income tax on the
commission payments it receives, as long as it is exempt from taxa-
tion. Such payments are not subject to taxation until the IC-DISC
distributes the payments to its shareholders as dividends. However,
the shareholders must pay annual interest on the deferred tax liabil-
ity, hence the term "interest charged-DISC."
Once the dividends are distributed, the IC-DISC's shareholders
will pay income tax on the dividends at the long-term capital gains
rate for qualified dividends. Because the maximum federal long-term
capital gains rate for qualified dividends is 20 percent and the max-
imum federal corporate income tax rate is 35 percent, the tax say-
23ings from using this planning technique may be 15 percent or more.
The 2014 General Assembly enacted Virginia Code section
58.1-401(9) to exempt IC-DISCs from Virginia corporate income
tax, the minimum tax on telecommunications companies, and the
tax imposed on electric suppliers, pipeline distribution compa-
20. Id.
21. See VA. DEP'T OF TAXATION, 2014 FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT 3 (Mar. 4, 2014),
available at http://leg1.state.va.us (click on the "2014" hyperlink; then enter SB515 and
click search tab; click on "LIS Bill Tracking SB515 2014 session" hyperlink; and click on
the "02/21/14 impact statement" hyperlink) (discussing Senate Bill 515).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 3-4.
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nies, gas utilities, and gas suppliers.24 This new tax exclusion is
effective for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2014.
5. Motion Picture Production Tax Credit Expanded
The 2014 General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-439.12:03 to increase the motion picture production tax cred-
it cap from $5 million per biennium to $6.5 million per fiscal year,
beginning on July 1, 2015, and to extend the sunset provisions for
this credit amount until December 31, 2018." In subsection (H),
this legislation also requires the Tax Department to publish in-
formation relating to the location of sites used in a movie produc-
tion and to qualify expenses for which credits are claimed, the
number of people employed in Virginia with respect to tax credits
claimed, and the total cost of the credit to the General Fund.17
This disclosure provision supersedes any nondisclosure or tax-
payer classified information such as those prevented from disclo-
sure by section 58.1-3."
6. Education Improvement Scholarships Credit Program
Amended
The 2014 General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-439.26 to permit taxpayers to claim the education improve-
ment scholarships credit against corporate income, personal in-
come, bank franchise, public service corporation, and insurance
premium taxes for the taxable year in which they made monetary
or marketable securities donations to qualifying scholarship
foundations.29 Prior to this legislative change, a taxpayer was re-
quired to wait to claim the credit until he or she filed a tax return
24. Act of Feb. 27, 2014, ch. 26, 2014 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-401(9) (Supp. 2014)); Act of Mar. 5, 2014, ch. 186, 2014 Va. Acts , _ (codi-
fled as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-401(9) (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
25. Ch. 26, 2014 Va. Acts _.
26. Act of Apr. 6, 2014, ch. 730, 2014 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.12:03 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
27. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.12:03(H) (Cum. Supp.
2014)).
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.12:03(H)(4) (Supp. 2014).
29. Act of Mar. 5, 2014, ch. 176, 2014 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.26 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
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for the taxable year following the year of the donation."o This en-
actment is effective for monetary or marketable securities dona-
tions made in tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2013."
B. Recent Judicial Decision: Forest Lodge, LLC v. Virginia
Department of Taxation
In a lengthy and hotly disputed case involving judicial review
of a qualified donation of land for which the applicant sought to
receive Virginia land preservation tax credits, the Albemarle
County Circuit Court held in Forest Lodge, LLC v. Virginia De-
partment of Taxation, that the value of Forest Lodge, LLC's
("Forest Lodge") qualified donation, for purposes of the Virginia
Land Preservation Incentives Act of 1999 (the "Virginia Land
Preservation Incentives Act"), was $76,700,000, thereby entitling
Forest Lodge to tax credits in the amount of $30,680,000.32 The
court also sustained Forest Lodge's plea in bar, holding that the
actual owners of Forest Lodge were necessary parties to the case
if the Tax Department desired to challenge the charitable dona-
tion deduction claimed by Forest Lodge and reported to the own-
ers on its partnership information return." The court also upheld
Forest Lodge's plea in bar assertion that the statute of limitations
had expired with respect to the Forest Lodge owners.
Forest Lodge is important because it is the first case litigated to
fruition that tests multiple aspects of the Virginia Land Preserva-
tion Incentives Act." Forest Lodge involved a number of critical
procedural and substantive tax law issues generated in multiple
letter opinions leading up to the final judgment order that formal-
ly ended the case. All of the procedural holdings by the court were
matters of first judicial impression. In an effort to illustrate these
critical rulings, this article sets out the facts and arguments
made by the parties to provide a comprehensive picture of this
bitterly contested case and of the various rulings by the court.
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.26(A) (Supp. 2014).
31. Id.
32. Final Order at 2, No. CL11000654-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 16, 2013) (Albemarle
County) [hereinafter Final Order].
33. Id. at 2-3.
34. Id. at 3.
35. The Virginia Land Preservation Incentives Act is codified at VA. CODE. ANN. §§
58.1-510 to -520 (Repl. Vol. 2013 & Cum. Supp. 2014).
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1. Background on the Biscuit Run Acquisition, Charitable
Donations, and Subsequent Administrative and Judicial
Proceedings
At a highly competitive auction in 2005, Forest Lodge acquired
Biscuit Run, a unique piece of land in Albemarle County, for
$46.2 million." Mainly due to zoning restrictions, only 5% of Al-
bemarle County is developable, 7 All but 400 acres of Biscuit Run
is within the developable area of Albemarle County." At the time
of acquisition, only 1024 home units could be constructed on Bis-
cuit Run in a by-right development based on its zoning." After its
acquisition of Biscuit Run, Forest Lodge received three offers
from national home builders to purchase Biscuit Run.0 Pulte
Homes offered $152 million; Newland Communities, LLC offered
$120 million; and Entertainment Enterprises, LLC offered $92
million, plus 25% of the profits of the potential Biscuit Run De-
velopment.4 ' The three offers shared one common feature: the
consideration offered was contingent on the rezoning of Biscuit
Run to allow for the construction of at least 3000 units.42
Forest Lodge sought to rezone Biscuit Run to Neighborhood
Model District zoning, a process which lasted approximately two
years and cost nearly $7 million.43 The Albemarle Planning Com-
mission initially rejected the Biscuit Run rezoning application by
a vote of 7-0." However, the Planning Commission ultimately ap-
proved the rezoning with proffers attached to its future develop-
ment.4 ' Biscuit Run was rezoned in September 2007 to Neighbor-
36. Transcript of Proceedings vol. 2 at 70, Forest Lodge, LLC v. Virginia Dep't of Tax-
ation, No. CL11000654-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 16, 2013) (Albemarle County) [hereinafter
Forest Lodge Transcript vol. 2] (on file with author).
37. Transcript of Proceedings vol. 1 at 25, Forest Lodge, LLC v. Virginia Dep't of Tax-
ation, No. CL11000654-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 15, 2013) (Albemarle County) [hereinafter
Forest Lodge Transcript vol. 1] (on file with author).
38. Id. at 75.
39. Id. at 74-75.
40. Id. at 35.
41. Id. at 35-37.
42. Id. at 37.
43. Id. at 78.
44. Id. at 39.
45. Id. at 90-91.
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hood Model District zoning." This rezoning allowed Forest Lodge
to construct a total of 3000 units on Biscuit Run.4 ' After the re-
zoning, another appraisal was commissioned by a financial insti-
tution to determine the highest and best use of Biscuit Run as of
October 23, 2007.4' The appraisal determined the fair market val-
ue of Biscuit Run to be $120 million.
For various reasons, none of the three offers closed and Forest
Lodge retained Biscuit Run." In mid-2009, the members of Forest
Lodge sought to donate Biscuit Run to the state for the creation of
a park in Albemarle County. After negotiations with the Virginia
Department of Conservation and Recreation ("DCR"), Forest
Lodge donated Biscuit Run in a bargain sale transaction for $9.8
million on December 30, 2009." Forest Lodge hired Patricia
O'Grady Filer to appraise the value of Biscuit Run as of Decem-
ber 30, 2009, the date of donation, for purposes of applying for
land preservation tax credits." Filer valued Biscuit Run at $87.7
million." Filer employed a valuation method using both the sales
comparison approach and the income approach. Filer used five
comparable sales: the 2005 sale of Biscuit Run, three sales in
Culpeper County, and one additional sale in Albemarle County."
In the discounted cash flow calculations performed under the in-
come approach, Filer used a discount rate based on interviews
with local developers, the national average, and an absorption
rate based on Biscuit Run's favorable location."
Even though not required to do so, Forest Lodge took one addi-
tional step and hired James H. Boykin, a national conservation
easement appraiser expert, to review Filer's appraisal." Boykin
requested changes and clarifications to Filer's appraisal." Once
46. Id. at 40.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 38.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 95-99.
51. Id. at 106-07.
52. See, e.g., id. at 206-10.
53. Id. at 200.
54. Id. at 166-67.
55. Id. at 195-99.
56. Id. at 264-65, 272.
57. Id. at 278.
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Boykin was satisfied with the changes and clarifications, he rec-
ommended approval of the appraisal based on the Uniform
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice."
2. Application to the Tax Department for Credits
Forest Lodge filed its application for land preservation tax
credits in late December 2009."' Despite the fact that Forest
Lodge submitted a qualified appraisal and fulfilled every other
requirement under Virginia Code section 58.1-510, the Tax De-
partment withheld the land preservation tax credits."o The Tax
Department also never concluded that the qualified appraisal was
either false or fraudulent." After meetings with Forest Lodge's
representatives, the Tax Department ordered its own appraisal of
Biscuit Run.62
The Tax Department ultimately hired Lawrence Salzman of
Salzman Real Estate Services in Richmond to appraise Biscuit
Run.6 3 Salzman is a licensed appraiser, an attorney, and a land
developer.6 4 The Tax Department had previously hired Salzman
on numerous occasions to act as counsel in disputes over land
preservation tax credits." Salzman also reviews appraisals sub-
mitted with credit applications on a regular basis for the Tax De-
partment.66 Salzman performed these services so frequently that
the Tax Department supplied him with his own workspace at the
Tax Department, a security badge, and an email address at
tax.virginia.gov. Salzman first reviewed Filer's appraisal in his
capacity as an advocate/attorney working for the Tax Department
to identify any issues or weaknesses in her appraisal." Prior to
hiring Salzman to perform the independent appraisal for the Tax
Department, two appraisers located in the Charlottesville Metro-
58. Id. at 274, 283.
59. Forest Lodge Transcript vol. 2, supra note 36, at Ex. 18.
60. Forest Lodge Transcript vol. 1, supra note 37, at 21, 115-16.
61. Forest Lodge Transcript vol. 2, supra note 36, at 132.
62. Id. at 129.
63. Id. at 130-31.
64. Id. at 148.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 148-50.
67. Id. at 151-52.
68. Id. at 148-49.
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politan Statistical Area ("1SA") were contacted to appraise Bis-
cuit Run." Both appraisers declined the engagement." At this
juncture, Salzman and an assistant tax commissioner decided
that the Tax Department would hire Salzman to perform the in-
dependent appraisal.'
Salzman delivered an appraisal to the Tax Department in
which he determined the value of Biscuit Run to be $39 million as
of December 30, 2009." Salzman used both the sales comparison
approach and the income approach to derive a value of Biscuit
Run. In the appraisal, Salzman used eight comparable sales: the
2005 sale of Biscuit Run, three sales in Chesterfield County,
three sales in Henrico County, and one sale in Culpeper County."
Forest Lodge believed Salzman's determination of the per unit
value of the 2005 sale of Biscuit Run to be flawed as he did not
use the 2005 zoning of Biscuit Run in his calculation; instead, he
used the figures from the 2007 rezoning of Biscuit Run in his cal-
culations." Salzman gave no weight to the three offers to pur-
chase Biscuit Run. The absorption rate used in the discounted
cash flow in the income approach was based on the number of
permits issued for lots in Albemarle instead of the actual number
of lots available for sale, and the discount rate used in the same
calculation was based on false information given to Salzman by a
representative of a non-affiliated developer.76 Regardless, the Tax
Department issued land preservation tax credits based on Salz-
, * 76man's valuation.
3. Forest Lodge Files an Administrative Appeal
Forest Lodge filed an administrative appeal with the Tax De-
partment for the issuance of the full amount of land preservation
69. Id. at 130-31.
70. Id. at 131.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 212; Transcript of Proceedings vol. 3 at 50, Forest Lodge, LLC v. Virgin-
ia Dep't of Taxation, No. CL11000654-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 17, 2013) (Albemarle County)
[hereinafter Forest Lodge Transcript vol. 3] (on file with author).
73. Forest Lodge Transcript vol. 2, supra note 36, at 206-11.
74. Id. at 260-69.
75. Forest Lodge Transcript vol. 3, supra note 72, at 58-61.
76. Forest Lodge Transcript vol. 2, supra note 36, at 130-31.
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tax credits requested." The Tax Department determined that a
second appraisal was needed." After requesting bids on the ap-
praisal, the Tax Department selected Samuel Long of Miller Long
and Associates of Roanoke to perform this appraisal. Long is an
appraiser with extensive experience appraising real property lo-
cated in Southwest Virginia." Prior to this appraisal, however,
Long had never appraised any property in Albemarle County and
had only appraised one parcel in the adjacent counties."o On Au-
gust 4, 2011, Long delivered an appraisal to the Tax Department
in which he valued Biscuit Run at $32,000,200.81 Long made no
attempt to interview any of Forest Lodge's representatives.82 Due
to this neglect, Long was unaware of the three offers to purchase
Biscuit Run and thus, did not consider them. Furthermore, Long
determined the value of Biscuit Run solely using the sales com-
parison approach. Long used ten comparable sales: five sales from
Chesterfield County, one sale from Culpeper County, one sale
from Henrico County, one sale from Botetourt County, one sale
from Bedford County, and one sale from Orange County.
Forest Lodge acquired a second appraisal of Biscuit Run from
Ivan Romenesko of Appraisal Group, Inc." Romenesko deter-
mined that the fair market value of Biscuit Run as of December
30, 2009 was $86.5 million." Romenesko arrived at this fair mar-
ket value using both the sales comparison approach and the in-
come approach." Romenesko used five comparable sales and one
offer: two sales in Albemarle County, one sale in Culpeper Coun-
ty, one sale in Caroline County, one sale in Stafford County, and
one offer to purchase a tract of land in Albemarle County." For
the discounted cash flow performed under the income approach,
Romenesko conducted a substantial survey of developers local to
77. Id. at 131.
78. Id. at 90-91.
79. See Forest Lodge Transcript vol. 3, supra note 72, at 85-90.
80. Id. at 131-34.
81. Id. at 122-23.
82. Id. at 136-37.
83. Id. at 89-90.
84. Id. at 110-14.
85. Forest Lodge Transcript vol. 2, supra note 36, at 32-33.
86. Id. at 33, 69.
87. Id. at 63.
88. See id. at 56-61.
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Albemarle County to determine the proper discount rate." Also,
Romenesko reviewed the permits for units issued in Albemarle
County to determine the actual number of lots available for sale
as opposed to the number of permits issued." This review re-
vealed less than 200 lots actually available for sale in Albemarle
County, as opposed to the 7000 permits issued by Albemarle
County." After the exchange of additional appraisals, the Tax
Department refused to issue additional credits.
4. Overview of Judicial Proceedings
Forest Lodge filed an Application for Correction of an Errone-
ous Action with Respect to a Tax Attribute ("Correction Applica-
tion") under Virginia Code section 58.1-1825 in the Albemarle
County Circuit Court.9 2 After discovery and several failed pre-
trial motions filed by the Tax Department in an attempt to have
the case dismissed, the trial began on April 15, 2013." At trial,
the court heard testimony and received evidence over three
days." All four appraisers testified with respect to their apprais-
als."
After hearing all of the testimony and receiving evidence, the
court issued a ruling from the bench in which Judge Paul D.
Peatross discussed all four appraisals." The court first addressed
the Tax Department's appraisals. 7 Judge Peatross began by stat-
ing that Long was a competent appraiser, but he had no experi-
ence in Albemarle County.9 8 Judge Peatross was also troubled by
the fact that Long gave no consideration to the purchase offers."
Moving to Salzman, Judge Peatross questioned Salzman's bias
and noted that Salzman had a conflict given his role in the Bis-
cuit Run tax credit dispute as both an attorney and an appraiser
89. Id. at 66-68.
90. Id. at 56-61.
91. Id. at 66-68.
92. Forest Lodge Transcript vol. 1, supra note 37, at 51-52.
93. See Final Order, supra note 32, at 1.
94. Forest Lodge Transcript vol. 3, supra note 72, at 262.
95. See id. at 261-62.
96. Id. at 262-63.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 262-65.
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for the Tax Department.' 0 Furthermore, Judge Peatross stated
that he did not understand why Salzman gave no weight to the
offers to purchase Biscuit Run and questioned several decisions
Salzman made in his appraisal.' For Filer's appraisal, the court
noted that there were some understandable criticisms regarding
Filer's allocation of development costs for the income approach.'02
Judge Peatross concurred with Romenesko's characterization of
Biscuit Run as a valuable piece of property based on several as-
pects.1os Ultimately, the court focused on the offers and their con-
tingency on rezoning.'04 Judge Peatross found that these offers
showed the value of Biscuit Run and its rezoning, which Salzman
and Long basically ignored.o' Based on all the information pre-
sented, Judge Peatross found Romenesko's appraisal of $86.5 mil-
lion the most credible."' Accordingly, the court ordered the Tax
Department to issue the additional $19 million of land preserva-
tion tax credits based on this $86.5 million fair market value de-
termination, bringing the total land preservation tax credits
awarded to Forest Lodge on the Biscuit Run transaction to
$30,680,000.10
5. Significant Rulings from the Forest Lodge Case
a. Grantor Tax Paid Record Bargain Sale Deed Does Not
Establish Fair Market Value of Donation
On December 30, 2009, Forest Lodge conveyed a 1194-acre
property known as "Biscuit Run" to the Commonwealth of Virgin-
ia DCR for use as a state park in exchange for $9,800,000.118 Be-
cause the consideration paid was less than the fair market value
of Biscuit Run, this donation was a bargain sale and a qualified
100. Id. at 263.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 264.
103. Id. at 263-65.
104. Id. at 262, 264-65.
105. Id. at 262-65.
106. Id.
107. Final Order, supra note 32, at 2.
108. Applicant's Memorandum Supporting Plea in Bar to Defendant's Amended Coun-
terclaim at 1, Forest Lodge, LLC v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, No. CL11000654-00 (Va.
Cir. Ct. July 10, 2013) (Albemarle County) [hereinafter Applicant's Memorandum Sup-
porting Plea in Bar] (on file with author).
2014] TAXATION 185
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
donation for purposes of the Virginia Land Preservation Incen-
tives Act."o' The sale of Biscuit Run to DCR was a bargain sale
under IRC § 170(h)(2)(A) for United States and Virginia income
tax purposes."o The recorded deed, titled "DEED OF BARGAIN
AND SALE," states:
Grantee acknowledges and agrees that Grantor intends to treat part
of this transaction as a charitable contribution pursuant to Sec-
tion 170 of the IRS Code. Grantor has informed Grantee that the
Property has a Fair Market Value in excess of the purchase price
and that a material inducement for Grantor to enter into the sale of
the Property is that Grantee qualifies as a tax exempt public body el-
igible to receive charitable contributions."
The Albemarle County Circuit Court Clerk's Cover Sheet,
("Cover Sheet") requests the amount of consideration to be pro-
vided. Forest Lodge listed the $9,800,000 consideration it received
from DCR on the Cover Sheet."2 Forest Lodge did not indicate the
fair market value of Biscuit Run on the Cover Sheet as it solely
requested the amount of consideration paid."' The court clerk as-
sessed Forest Lodge with $9800 in recordation tax, based on the
reported $9,800,000 consideration paid, which Forest Lodge paid
when the deed was submitted for recordation. "4
The Tax Department filed a demurrer in response to the Forest
Lodge Correction Application."' The Tax Department asserted
that Forest Lodge was judicially estopped from asserting that the
value of Biscuit Run was greater than $9,800,000, based on the
recording of the deed. The Tax Department argued that the value
for purposes of the recordation tax determined both the tax liabil-
ity for recordation tax purposes and the resulting amount of the
109. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-510, 512(C) (Repl. Vol. 2013 & Supp. 2014).
110. Forest Lodge Transcript vol. 1, supra note 37, at 104-08.
111. Applicant's Opposition to Defendant Commonwealth of Virginia Department of
Taxation's Demurrer at 1-2, Forest Lodge, LLC v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, No.
CL11000654-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 14, 2011) (Albemarle County) [hereinafter Applicant's
Opposition to Defendant's Demurrer] (on file with author).
112. Id. at Ex. C.
113. Id.
114. Id. at Ex. E.
115. Memorandum [of Defendant] Supporting Demurrer at 1, Forest Lodge, LLC v.
Virginia, Dep't of Taxation, No. CL111000654-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 18, 2011) (Albemarle
County) (on file with author).
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land preservation tax credits Forest Lodge was entitled to re-
*116ceive.
Forest Lodge argued that it consistently asserted that the Bis-
cuit Run transaction was a bargain sale, pointing out that the
deed was labeled as a deed of bargain sale and that the language
within the deed itself proclaimed that Forest Lodge and DCR
agreed that Forest Lodge intended to treat part of this transac-
tion as a charitable contribution pursuant to IRC § 170."' Forest
Lodge also argued that the grantor tax is solely imposed on the
consideration paid, not on the fair market value of the property,
noting that according to the statute's plain text in Virginia Code
section 58.1-802(A), the tax is triggered when the consideration or
the value of the interest, whichever is greater, exceeds $100."8
Forest Lodge also pointed to the regulation promulgated by the
Tax Department, which states that the grantor's tax is based up-
on the net consideration as opposed to the greater of either the
net consideration paid or the actual value of the property con-
veyed, and a number of state Tax Commissioner rulings holding
that the grantor's tax is imposed solely on the consideration of the
deed.'19 Lastly, Forest Lodge argued that judicial estoppel did not
apply because they did not take any factual position that is incon-
sistent with a stance taken in prior litigation.120 The filing of a
deed with the court clerk's office for processing recordation taxes
116. The Tax Department asserted the issue was nonjusticiable because the action of
recording the deed by the court clerk rendered the dispute moot as the clerk's actions were
judicial in nature thus eliminating a live controversy. Id. at 2-4 (citing Bentley Funding
Group, LLC v. SK&R Group, LLC, 269 Va. 315, 325-27, 609 S.E. 2d 49, 54-55 (2005);
Hankins v. Town of Virginia Beach, 182 Va. 642, 644, 29 S.E. 2d 831, 832 (1944); Potts v.
Mathieson Alkali Works, 165 Va. 196, 225, 181 S.E. 521, 533 (1935)).
117. Applicant's Opposition to Defendant's Demurrer, supra note 111, at 1-2.
118. Id. at 5.
119. Id. at 5-7 (citing 23 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 10-320-30(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013)); VA.
DEP'T OF TAXATION, PUB. DoC. 11-186 (Nov. 16, 2011), available at http://www.policylibr
ary.tax.virginia,gov/OTP/policy.nsf (follow the "Tax Bulletins" hyperlink; then follow the
hyperlink for 2011; then follow the "11-186" hyperlink); VA. DEP'T OF TAXATION, PUB. DOC.
10-266 (Dec. 15, 2010), available at http://www.policylibrary.tax.virginia,gov/OTP/policy.
nsf (follow the "Tax Bulletins" hyperlink; then follow the hyperlink for 2010; then follow
the "10-266" hyperlink); VA. DEP'T OF TAXATION, PUB. Doc. 10-130 (July 9, 2010), available
at http://www.policylibrary.tax.virginia,gov/OTP/policy.nsf (follow the "Tax Bulletins" hy-
perlink; then follow the hyperlink for 2010; then follow the "10-130" hyperlink); VA. DEP'T
OF TAXATION, PUB. Doc. 04-97 (Sept. 8, 2004), available at http://www.policylibrary.tax.vir
ginia,gov/OTP/policy.nsf (follow the "Tax Bulletins" hyperlink; then follow the hyperlink
for 2004; then follow the "04-97" hyperlink).
120. See Applicant's Opposition to Defendant's Demurrer, supra note 111, at 9.
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is a ministerial, clerical matter, not a judicial action.12 1 Forest
Lodge argued that all of its actions were consistent and that the
fair market value of Biscuit Run exceeded the consideration re-
ceived from DCR, thereby demonstrating a justifiable controver-
122
sy.
The circuit court overruled the Tax Department's demurrer.'
In a letter opinion, the court found that judicial estoppel did not
apply because Forest Lodge never made a representation that the
$9,800,000 payment it received from DCR was the fair market
value of Biscuit Run and that the recording of a deed in the
clerk's office was not a prior judicial proceeding.124
b. The Circuit Court Decides the Qualified Appraisal Issue and
the Appropriate Standard of Review
The Tax Department next filed a motion for summary judg-
ment to dispose of the case asserting that Forest Lodge's apprais-
al supporting its request for land preservation tax credits was not
a "qualified appraisal" as defined by the IRC, and that the proper
license was not obtained by the appraising entity to satisfy the
requirements of Virginia Code section 54.1-2011. 125 Their motion
also asserted that Forest Lodge lacked the donative intent neces-
sary to qualify for the tax credits because the requirements of
IRC § 170 apply to the fee simple gift.126
The Tax Department argued that Virginia Code section 58.1-
512(B), setting forth the requirements an applicant must follow to
121. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2130 (Repl. Vol. 2013 & Supp. 2014).
122. Specifically, Forest Lodge argued it consistently took the position that the fair
market value exceeds the DCR payment as reflected in the deed itself, the application for
tax credits filed with the Tax Department, and the judicial application filed by Forest
Lodge to initiate the litigation. Applicant's Opposition to Defendant's Demurrer, supra
note 111, at 9.
123. Order Overruling Defendant's Demurrer, Forest Lodge, LLC v. Virginia, Dep't of
Taxation, No. CL111000654-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 27, 2012) (Albemarle County) [hereinaf-
ter Order Overruling Defendant's Demurrer] (on file with author).
124. Letter from Paul M. Peatross, Jr., Judge Designate, to Counsel of Record, Forest
Lodge, LLC v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, No. CL111000654-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb 3, 2012)
(on file with author).
125. Tax Department's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Forest Lodge, LLC v. Vir-
ginia Dep't of Taxation, No. CL1 1000654-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 13, 2012) (Albemarle Coun-
ty) (on file with author).
126. Id.
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obtain land preservation tax credits, should be strictly construed
in the same manner as exemptions from tax, with all doubts be-
ing resolved against the taxpayer.127
Relying on this standard, the Tax Department argued that
Forest Lodge's appraisal company allowed its corporate charter to
lapse and under Virginia Code section 54.1-2011(E), the apprais-
er's corporation was required to be licensed by the Virginia Real
Estate Appraiser Board and it was not so licensed. Therefore, the
Tax Department contended that Forest Lodge's appraisal was not
a qualified appraisal within the meaning of section 58.1-512(B).128
Lastly, the Tax Department argued that all transfers of real
property interests must meet the requirements of IRC § 170(h),
and Forest Lodge did not meet those requirements because it re-
placed the Biscuit Run property, which it pledged as security for
its acquisition financing, with an assignment of the land preser-
vation tax credits it was to receive on the bargain sale donation of
the property to DCR (a substitution of collateral) because DCR
needed the property to be debt free upon receipt of the gift.'29 The
Tax Department argued that this exchange of collateral was in-
dicative of a lack of donative intent by Forest Lodge which under
the rules of strict construction, disqualified Forest Lodge's appli-
cation for land preservation tax credits."3 '
As to the appropriate standard of review that should be applied
to the statutory requirements a donor must meet to receive tax
credits, Forest Lodge argued that the customary rules of statuto-
ry construction apply.'"' Forest Lodge asserted that the height-
ened "strict construction" rule applicable to a tax exemption
should not apply to a statute that generates tax credits.132 A tax
127. Id. at 2-3.
128. Memorandum Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment at 6-7, Forest Lodge,
LLC v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, No. CL11000654-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 13, 2013) (Albe-
marle County) [hereinafter Memorandum Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment] (on
file with author).
129. Id. at 9-10, 12.
130. Id. at 12.
131. Forest Lodge's Memorandum in Opposition to the Department of Taxation's Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment at 4, Forest Lodge, LLC v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, No.
CL11000654-00 (Va. Cir. Ct., Dec. 17, 2012) (Albemarle County) [hereinafter Forest
Lodge's Memorandum in Opposition of Summary Judgment] (on file with author).
132. Id.
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credit is not equivalent to a tax exemption."' It has not been de-
fined or classified as an exemption from tax by the General As-
sembly or by any published decision by a Virginia court. A tax
credit does not reduce or change the tax liability of a taxpayer;
rather it is a method of tax payment.3 4 Forest Lodge noted that
the Tax Department, in its own published tax return forms, dif-
ferentiates tax credits from tax exemptions because tax credits
serve a different function (i.e., payment of a tax versus exclusion
or exemption from tax).'"' The determination of whether an ex-
emption should apply is determined well before any amount of li-
ability for the tax is ever taken into account.' It is not analogous
to a tax credit that is used as a payment to reduce, satisfy, and
offset tax liability."' Additionally, Forest Lodge pointed out that
in those judicial decisions that involved tax credits, the Supreme
Court of Virginia never applied the statutory interpretation rule
of strict construction advocated by the Tax Department in this
case. Rather, Forest Lodge argued that the supreme court has
provided clear guidance on how Virginia statutes must be inter-
preted by the courts when the meaning of a statute is at issue.'
When determining the implication of a section of the Virginia
Code, the supreme court instructs as follows:
While in the construction of statutes the constant endeavor of the
courts is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legisla-
ture, that intention must be gathered from the words used, unless a
literal construction would involve a manifest absurdity. Where the
legislature has used words of a plain and definite import the courts
cannot put upon them a construction which amounts to holding the
legislature did not mean what it has actually expressed. 3 9
In its decision on the applicable rule of statutory construction, the
circuit court judge agreed with Forest Lodge's position and held
that the traditional statutory construction rules apply as the su-






138. Id. at 6.
139. Id. (citing City of Winchester v. American Woodmark Corp., 250 Va. 451, 456, 464
S.E.2d 148, 152 (1995)).
140. Letter Opinion, Forest Lodge, LLC v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, No. CL11000654-
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With respect to the Tax Department's argument that Filer's
appraisal was not a "qualified appraisal" as the term is used in
Virginia Code section 58.1-512(B), Forest Lodge noted that its
appraiser was licensed by the Real Estate Appraiser Board of the
Virginia Department of Professional and Occupational Regula-
tions (the "Appraiser Board") and that she met all of the require-
ments of a qualified appraisal set out by statute.'4 ' While Filer's
company had lapsed as a corporation, Filer, who was properly li-
censed at all times, signed the appraisal. The wording within Fil-
er's appraisal report indicated that the report was "her" report
and the certification used the words "I" and "my" which indicated
that the report was by the person, not by the former corpora-
tion.'42 Filer continued to use the name of her former corporation
after its corporate charter lapsed and operated her appraisal
business as a sole proprietorship.143 Forest Lodge also argued
that a sole proprietorship is not a separate business entity such
as a corporation, partnership, limited liability company, or any
"other business entity" requiring the appraiser to register her sole
proprietorship."'
The circuit court agreed with Forest Lodge and found that the
appraisal report met the requirements of section 58.1-512(B) and
that the appraiser was qualified.'4 ' The court noted that the ap-
praisal report was prepared by the individual appraiser because
of how it was signed and certified, even though the cover page of
the report said it was prepared by Piedmont Appraisal Company
(Filer's former corporation).'4 6 The court also found that a sole
proprietorship is not an "other business entity" under Virginia
Code section 54-2011, so the proprietorship did not need to be reg-
istered with the Appraiser Board provided that the individual
appraiser was properly registered.'4 7
00 (Va. Cir. ct. Feb. 5, 2013) (Albemarle County) [hereinafter Forest Lodge Letter Opin-
ion] (on file with author).
141. Forest Lodge's Memorandum In Opposition of Summary Judgment, supra note
131, at 8.
142. Id. at 11.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 11-13.
145. Forest Lodge, LLC v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 86 Va. Cir. 230, 232, 234 (2013)
(Albemarle County).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 233.
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c. Circuit Court Decides That Only Donations of Less-Than-Fee
Interests in Real Property Must Meet Requirements of IRC §
170(h) to Receive Tax Credits
Virginia Code sections 58.1-511 and 58.1-512(c)(2) require a
less-than-fee simple interest, such as an open-space easement or
conservation easement, to satisfy all of the IRC § 170 require-
ments for a charitable contribution deduction."' The Tax De-
partment argued that section 58.1-512(c) requires the application
of the same rules for donations of less-than-fee interests, such as
conservation easements, to apply to donations of fee simple inter-
ests.1' Specifically, the Tax Department asserted that the substi-
tution of collateral related to Forest Lodge's acquisition financing
of Biscuit Run, from the subject Biscuit Run property to an as-
signment of the land preservation tax credits to serve as the new
collateral interest for the loan, demonstrated a lack of donative
intent by Forest Lodge.' The inference is that Forest Lodge was
motivated by a business or financial reason as opposed to a chari-
tably disposed reason. If correct, the Tax Department argued that
the requirements of IRC § 170 are not met and therefore no tax
credits may be awarded to Forest Lodge.'
Forest Lodge contended that the Tax Department's argument
ignores the plain language in section 58.1-512(c)(2), which states
in pertinent part:
Qualified donations shall include the conveyance of a fee interest in
real property or the conveyance in perpetuity of a less-than-fee in-
terest in real property, such as a conservation restriction, preserva-
tion restriction, agricultural preservation restrictions, or watershed
preservation restriction, provided that such less-than-fee interest
qualifies as a charitable deduction under § 170(h) of the United
States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.52
Forest Lodge also noted that the General Assembly repeated its
intent in this same section with the requirement of affidavits to
be included with land preservation credit applications, certifying
148. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-511, -512(C)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2013 & Supp. 2014).
149. Tax Department's Reply Memorandum Supporting Motion for Summary Judg-
ment at 8-9, Forest Lodge, LLC v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, CL 11000654-00 (Va. Cir.
Ct. Dec. 20, 2012) (Albemarle County) (on file with author).
150. See id. at 13-14, 16.
151. Id. at 12.
152. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-512(C)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2013 & Supp. 2014) (emphasis added).
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that the donation of a "less-than-fee" interest meet the require-
ments of IRC § 170(h)."'
Agreeing with Forest Lodge, the court found that the tradition-
al "words of plain and definite import" rule of construction ap-
plied, and that there was no requirement that Forest Lodge need-
ed to meet the requirements of IRC § 170. The Tax Department's
motion for summary judgment was denied on that ground.'54
d. Circuit Court Sustained Forest Lodge's Plea in Bar
Following the court's decision to deny the Tax Department's
motion for summary judgment, the Tax Department was permit-
ted to add a counterclaim to challenge Forest Lodge's charitable
contribution deduction on its Biscuit Run gift to DCR."' In es-
sence, the Tax Department wanted to disallow the charitable de-
duction reported on Forest Lodge's pass-through entity infor-
mation return so that the individual members of Forest Lodge
would have their individual income tax returns adjusted."' By
disallowing each member's pro rata share of the charitable dona-
tion deduction allocated to them, the individual members were
excluded as parties in the Forest Lodge tax credit case."'
Before addressing the parties' arguments and the court's deci-
sion, it is helpful to establish the background on Virginia pass-
through entity income taxation. Virginia Code section 58.1-390.1
defines pass-through entities as "any entity, including . .. a lim-
ited liability company . .. that is recognized as a separate entity
for federal income tax purposes, in which the partners, members
or shareholders report their share of the income, gains, losses,
deductions and credits from the entity on their federal income tax
returns.""' Owners of pass-through entities are liable for Virginia
153. Id. § 58.1-512(D)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2013 & Supp. 2014).
154. Forest Lodge, LLC v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 86 Va. Cir. 230, 232 (2013) (Al-
bemarle County).
155. See Graelyn Brashear, Judge Says State Devalued Biscuit Run Property, C-
VILLECOM (Apr. 23, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.c-ville.com/judge-says-state-devalued-
biscuit-run-property/#.U6Y3RoldX58.
156. See Applicant's Memorandum Supporting Plea in Bar, supra note 108, at 2.
157. Will Goldsmith, Taxpayer State Park, C-VILLE.COM (Oct. 26, 2013, 12:00 AM),
http://www.c-ville.com/TaxpayerStatePark/#.U6Yz7I1dX58.
158. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-390.1 (Repl. Vol. 2013).
2014] 193
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
income tax in their individual capacities on pass-through entity
income."9 Every pass-through entity doing business in Virginia,
or having income from Virginia sources, is required to file an in-
formation return with the Tax Department.' This return shows
the distribution of pass-through entity income to the owners, who
then report the income and pay income tax on their personal Vir-
ginia income tax returns.6 '
Forest Lodge filed a plea in bar against the Tax Department's
counterclaim, seeking to disallow the charitable donation deduc-
tion reported on Forest Lodge's 2009 pass-through entity infor-
mation return.162 Forest Lodge argued in support of its plea in bar
that Forest Lodge is the wrong party to defend the challenge to
the charitable contribution deduction because it is not a taxpayer
with respect to Virginia income tax."' Forest Lodge's owners are
the taxpayers with respect to Forest Lodge's income tax attrib-
utes (for example, deduction) and they are the proper parties up-
on whom any claim should be asserted with regard to an income
tax attribute of Forest Lodge.' There is no provision in the Vir-
ginia Code that allows a pass-through entity, such as Forest
Lodge, to act as a substitute for its owners in a representative ca-
pacity when it comes to the payment of Virginia income tax on
the pass-through entity income."' In essence, Forest Lodge ar-
gued that the Tax Department is trying to obtain the equivalent
of a declaratory judgment action before assessing any additional
income taxes."' Forest Lodge asserted that the Tax Department
is side-stepping the explicit procedure in the Virginia Code for
collecting additional taxes which revolves exclusively around the
taxpayer, and is not a substitute for the taxpayer such as a pass-
through entity."'
Forest Lodge also argued that the Tax Department cannot as-
sess taxes against such individual taxpayers who are members of
159. Id. § 58.1-390.2 (Repl. Vol. 2013).
160. Id. § 58.1-392 (Repl. Vol. 2013).
161. Id. § 58.1-391 (Repl. Vol. 2013).
162. Applicant's Memorandum Supporting Plea in Bar, supra note 108, at 2-3.
163. Id. at 2.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 4-5.
166. Id. at 3.
167. Id. at 6.
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Forest Lodge with respect to any item of pass-through tax attrib-
ute from Forest Lodge to its members because of the statute of
limitations with respect to such attributes.168 Virginia Code sec-
tion 58.1-1812(A) requires an assessment to be issued within
three years after the filing of the return, which, according to the
Tax Commissioner, contains an understatement of the proper
taxes owed."' However, the General Assembly adopted a separate
statute of limitations that applies solely to pass-through entity
items. Virginia Code section 58.1-394.3(A) states:
The period for assessing any tax imposed by this chapter that is at-
tributable to any pass-through entity item with respect to any owner
of a pass-through entity shall not expire before the date that is three
years after the later of (i) the last day for filing the pass-through en-
tity return for the taxable year of the pass-through entity, as extend-
ed, or (ii) the date on which the pass-through entity return for such
taxable year was filed.1 70
Within the same section, subsection (E) states:
The provisions of this section shall apply to any tax attributable to
items of income, gain, loss, deduction, credit, or other tax attribute
that is recognized or reportable by the pass-through entity that is
required to be reported by the owner of the pass-throuqh entity pur-
suant to § 58.1-391 or the other sections of this chapter.
Forest Lodge argued that by including subsection (E) to section
58.1-394.3, the General Assembly left no question that the period
for assessing income tax applies to deductions reported by a pass-
through entity to the owners of the pass-through entity.'72 Section
58.1-394(A) explicitly gives the Tax Department a deadline of
three years after the last day for filing the pass-through entity re-
turn to assess additional income taxes attributable to any pass-
through entity item. 73
The Tax Department argued that section 58.1-1826, which
deals with the correction of tax assessments or the correction of
an action of transferred credit or other tax attribute, is broad and
provides the court with "all the powers and duties" of the tax au-
168. Id. at 10.
169. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1812(A) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
170. Id. § 58.1-394.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
171. Id. § 58.1-394.3(E) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
172. Applicant's Memorandum Supporting its Plea Bar, supra note 108, at 8-9.
173. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-394(A) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
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thority which made the assessment complained of as of the time
the assessment was made to correct the assessment or action.7 1
In response to the Tax Department's arguments, the circuit
court stated that the point made in the plea in bar is that the Tax
Department has no legal authority to correct a "charitable deduc-
tion" of Forest Lodge because Forest Lodge, as a pass-through en-
tity, pays no tax. Accordingly, the Tax Department cannot assess
additional income tax to Forest Lodge.' 7' The court noted that it is
not aware of any legal authority for Forest Lodge, as a pass-
through entity, to substitute as proxy for the individual taxpay-
ers."' The court also held that the Tax Department could not
make any assessments against the members of Forest Lodge be-
cause the statute of limitations in this case set out in Virginia
Code section 58.1-394(A) now bars any such tax assessments.
The Forest Lodge charitable contribution deduction for the 2009
taxable year was reported on the 2009 pass-through entity infor-
mation return that was timely filed on or before April 15, 2010.178
As of April 15, 2013, no tax assessments have been made. ' This
statute of limitations applies to the owners not parties to this
case."8' The court noted that even in the event that Forest Lodge
could substitute as a proxy for the member taxpayers, the statute
of limitations bars any assessment.'8 ' In conclusion, the court held
that section 58.1-1826 does not give the court power to disallow a
charitable deduction and allow the Tax Department to collect ad-
ditional taxes; the court noted that even if it could, the statute of
limitations had run and no additional taxes, may be collected.'
The court sustained Forest Lodge's plea in bar.
174. Applicant's Memorandum Supporting Plea in Bar, supra note 108, at 6-7; VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-1826 (Repl. Vol. 2013).
175. Letter Opinion on Forest Lodge's Plea in Bar at 2, Forest Lodge, LLC v. Virginia,
Dep't of Taxation, No. CL111000654-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 8, 2013) (Albemarle County)
[hereinafter Letter Opinion on Forest Lodge's Plea in Bar] (on file with author).









e. Post Script to the Trial
On October 23, 2013, the Tax Department filed an emergency
motion for stay pending appeal with the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia in an attempt to prevent the portion of the trial court's decision
ordering the Tax Department to issue Forest Lodge the remain-
ing $19 million land presentation tax credits.'"' In support of their
request for the extraordinary action, the Tax Department assert-
ed the same positions as it presented at trial.'84 On October 31,
2013, Forest Lodge submitted its response.' First, Forest Lodge
argued that the stay pending appeal is moot because the Tax De-
partment issued the $19 million in tax credits to Forest Lodge one
day after it filed its emergency motion for stay with the supreme
court."' Forest Lodge also argued that the Tax Department could
not meet the four-part test necessary for a stay.' Specifically,
Forest Lodge argued that: (1) the Tax Department cannot show
likelihood of success; (2) the Tax Department will not suffer any
harm by issuing the tax credits; (3) Forest Lodge and potential
tax credit purchases will be harmed by the issuance of a stay; and
(4) it is in the public interest for the tax credits to be issued. '88
The supreme court entered an order denying the stay on Novem-
ber 7, 2013.189 On June 25, 2014, the supreme court extended an
order denying the Tax Department's petition for appeal, indicat-
ing that the circuit court's decision contains no reversible error.8 o
183. Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 2, Virginia Dep't of Taxation v.
Forest Lodge, LLC, No. CL11000654-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 23, 2013) (Albemarle County) (on
file with author).
184. See generally Respondent's Response to Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Ap-
peal at 5, Forest Lodge, LLC v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, No. CL11000654 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Oct. 31, 2013) (Albemarle County) (on file with author) (referencing arguments raised in
prior motions filed by the Tax Department and stating that "[i]n its motions before [the]
Court, the Tax Department regurgitates [those] arguments").
185. Id. at 12.
186. Id. at 3.
187. Id. at 4.
188. Id.
189. Order Denying Dep't of Taxation's Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal,
Virginia Dep't of Taxation v. Forest Lodge, LLC (Va. Nov. 7, 2013) regarding No. CL
111000654 (Va. Cir Ct. Oct. 28, 2013) (Albemarle County) [hereinafter Forest Lodge, Nov.
7 Order] (on file with author).
190. Id.
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II. RECENT SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY AFFECTING SALES
AND USE TAx
The 2014 General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-602 to impose the Retail Sales and Use Tax on separately
stated charges for equipment available for lease or purchase by a
provider of satellite television programming to a customer of such
programming."' Such equipment sold to a provider of satellite
television programming for subsequent lease or purchase would
be deemed a sale for resale.'9 2 Prior to this legislative change, sat-
ellite television programmers, and not their customers, were lia-
ble for the sales and use tax on tangible personal property used
and consumed in connection with the provision of a service, re-
gardless of whether the tangible personal property will be subse-
quently sold or leased to customers of the satellite television pro-
193grammer.
III. REAL PROPERTY
A. Recent Significant Legislative Activity
1. Exemption for Religious Bodies Expanded
The 2014 General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-3606(A)(2), which provides for the exemption of real property
for churches and religious bodies, to include:
(a) property used for outdoor worship activities; (b) property for an-
cillary and accessory purposes as allowed under the local zoning or-
dinance, the dominant purpose of which is to support or augment the
principal religious worship use; and (c) property used as required by
federal, state, or local law.19 4
191. Act of Mar. 27, 2014, ch. 359, 2014 Va. Acts ,__ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-602 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
192. Id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-602 (Supp. 2014).
193. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-602 (Supp. 2014); see VA. DEP'T OF TAXATION, PUB. DOc. 13-
130 (July 5, 2013), available at http://www.policylibrary.tax.virginia.gov/OTP/policy.nsf
(follow "Rulings of the Tax Commissioner" hyperlink; then follow "2013" hyperlink; then
click on "13-130" hyperlink); VA. DEP'T OF TAXATION, PUB. Doc. 97-392 (Sept. 29, 1997),
available at http://www.policylibrary.tax.virginia.gov/OTP/policy.nsf (follow "1997' hyper-
link; then click on "97-392" hyperlink).
194. Act of Apr. 4, 2014, ch. 555, 2014 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-3606(A)(2) (Supp. 2014)); Act of Apr. 4, 2014, ch. 615, 2014 Va. Acts -,
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The legislation contains an enactment clause indicating that the
"dominant purpose" language is intended to follow the Supreme
Court of Virginia's interpretation in Virginia Baptist Homes, Inc.
v. Botetourt County. 19
2. Statute of Limitations Reduced for Non-Judicial Sale of Tax
Delinquent Real Property
The 2014 General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-3975 to reduce the period of local Virginia property tax de-
linquency from five years to three years before a local treasurer
or other officer may publicly auction any unimproved parcel of re-
al property that is assessed at less than $10,000 and that
measures less than 4000 square feet or is a parcel of any size that
is determined to be unsuitable for building due to its size, shape,
zoning, or soils."'
3. Notice of Change in Real Property Assessment to Require
More Information
The 2014 General Assembly amended Virginia Code sections
58.1-3300 and 58.1-3301 to require additional information to be
included in a notice of change in the assessment or the reassess-
ment issued by localities relating to real property taxes."' The no-
tice must include the current appraised values and the two im-
mediately preceding appraised values.' The notice must also
inform each property owner of the right to view and make copies
of records maintained by the local assessment office."' In addi-
tion, for all notices, except those where the change in assessment
is solely the result of the construction or the addition of new im-
provements to the real estate, the notice must identify the tax
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3606 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
195. Ch. 555, 2014 Va. Acts ; ch. 615, 2014 Va. Acts_; VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3606
(Supp. 2014) (citing Virginia Baptist Homes, Inc. v. Botetourt Cnty., 276 Va. 656, 668, 668
S.E.2d 119, 125 (2008)).
196. Act of Feb. 27, 2014, ch. 28, 2014 Va. Acts -, (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-3975 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
197. Act of Mar. 3, 2014, ch. 71, 2014 Va. Acts -, (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-3300 (Cum. Supp. 2014)); Act of Apr. 23, 2014, ch. 802, 2014 Va. Acts
-, - (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3300, 3301 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
198. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3330(B), -3301(B) (Supp. 2014).
199. Id.
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rates, the amount of the total tax levies, and the percentage
changes from the immediately two preceding tax years.200
B. Recent Significant Opinions of the Attorney General
1. Short-Term Rental Property
The Commissioner of the Reserve for Culpeper County inquired
as to how a locality that does not have a local ordinance establish-
ing either a merchants' capital tax or a tax on short-term rental
property, may tax short-term rental property."o' This issue arose
because in 2010 the Virginia legislature amended Virginia Code
section 58.1-3510.6(E) to exclude short-term rental property from
classification and taxation as tangible personal property.2 0 2 The
Virginia Code now provides that short-term rental property may
be taxed as merchants' capital, or a locality may adopt a local or-
dinance authorizing a short-term rental property tax.203 The at-
torney general opined that short-term rental property shall be
classified as a distinct category of merchants' capital and that lo-
cality may tax it as merchants' capital or as short-term rental
property, but not as tangible personal property. 20 4 He also opined
that a locality may lawfully decline to impose a tax or merchants'
capital, including short-term rental property.205 Finally, "the at-
torney general stated that absence of a local ordinance imposing a
tax on merchants' capital or short-term rental property repre-
sents a choice by the locality's governing body not to impose a tax
on such property."20 6
2. Interplay Between Land Use Assessments and Conservation
Easements
Larry Davis, the County Attorney for Albemarle County, in-
quired as to three issues relating to real estate assessments and
200. Id.
201. Op. to Hon. Terry L. Yowell 1 (July 12, 2013), available at http://www.oag.state.
va.us/ (follow "Official Opinions" hyperlink; then follow "2013" hyperlink; then follow "Ju-
ly" hyperlink; then follow "12-105" hyperlink) [hereinafter Op. 12-105].
202. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3510.6(E) (Supp. 2014).
203. Id. § 58.1-3510.4(A) (Supp. 2014).
204. Op. 12-105, supra note 201, at 1-2.
205. Id. at 3.
206. Id. at 1.
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property subject to conservation easements for purposes of land
assessment.2 0 ' First, the County Attorney inquired as to whether
a perpetual conservation easement must satisfy the minimum
acreage requirements of Virginia Code section 58.1-3233 in order
to qualify for land use assessment and taxation under section
10.1-1011.208 The second question raised was whether land under
a conservation easement must continue to meet the minimum
acreage standards of section 58.1-3233 in order to annually quali-
fy for land use assessment and taxation.20 9 The last question con-
cerned whether back taxes and roll-back must be imposed to
correct any erroneous under-assessment of non-qualifying proper-
ty.210
The attorney general opined on each of the three questions
posed.2 ' First, the attorney general noted that conservation
easement land covered by provisions of the land use assessment
and taxation statute must meet the minimum acreage require-
ment of section 58.13-233 at the time the easement is dedicated,
unless the easement was placed on the property before the local
land use assessment ordinance was adopted. 212 The attorney gen-
eral then stated that subsequent changes in acreage in use "per-
mitted under the conservation easement would not affect the con-
tinuing eligibility of the land for use assessment under [Virginia
Code section] 10.1-1011(C).""' The attorney general further stat-
ed that no back taxes, including the roll-back tax, may be im-
posed when conservation easement land, through apparent un-
permitted use or development, no longer appears to qualify for
use assessment under section 10.1-1011(C).214 The attorney gen-
eral concluded that "upon the initiation of appropriate proceed-
ings and the making of factual findings respecting the land and
207. Op. to Larry W. Davis, Cnty. Att'y, Albemarle Cnty. 1 (Sept. 20, 2013), available
at http://www.oag.state.va.us/ (follow "Official Opinions" hyperlink; then follow "2013" hy-
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easement in question, such subsequent violations of the conserva-
tion easement could render the land ineligible for [land use] as-
sessment under [Virginia Code section] 10.1-1011(C).",215
IV. TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY
A. Recent Significant Legislative Activity
1. Separate Classification for the Tangible Personal Property of
a New Business
The 2014 General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-3506(A) to create a separate classification for the tangible
personal property of a business for its first two taxable years.2 16
To qualify, the business must meet the requirements of a local
business incentive program, even if the locality at issue does not
currently provide such a program.2 17 Section 58.1-3703 states the
terms of a local business incentive program and provides that a
qualifying business is one that locates for the first time in the lo-
cality, excluding those businesses that first locate in the locality
as a result of a merger, acquisition, similar business combination,
name change, or a change in business form.2 " This legislation au-
thorizes localities to impose a tax on this tangible personal prop-
erty at a lower rate than that applicable to the general class of
tangible personal property.
2. Exemption for Solar Energy Property No Longer a Local
Option
The 2014 General Assembly enacted legislation to provide a lo-
cal property tax exemption for solar energy equipment, facilities
and devices owned or operated by businesses that collect, gener-
ate, transfer, or store thermal or electric energy, by expanding
the definition of "certified pollution control equipment and facili-
215. Id. at 2.
216. Act of Mar. 31, 2014, ch. 409, 2014 Va. Acts _, (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-3506(A)(44) (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
217. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3506(A)(45) (Supp. 2014).
218. Id. § 58.1-3703(D) (Repl. Vol. 2013 & Supp. 2014)).
219. Id. § 58.1-3506(A)(45) (Supp. 2014); see also id. § 58.1-3703(D) (Repl. Vol. 2013 &
Supp. 2014).
202 [Vol. 49:171
ties" in sections 58.1-3660(A) and 58.1-3661(B) to include such
property.220 The exemption also includes solar photovoltaic sys-
tems that have up to 20 megawatts of generation capacity.2"' Prior
to adopting this legislation, local governing bodies were author-
ized, but not required, to exempt solar energy property.222
V. MISCELLANEOUS LocAL TAXES
A. Recent Significant Legislative Activity
1. Mineral Lands and Severance Taxes Amended
The 2014 General Assembly enacted several changes to the as-
sessment of mineral lands for property and severance taxes.223
The new legislation authorizes the commissioners of revenue to
enter into agreements with taxpayers that pertain to the fair
market value of mineral lands for purposes of the real property
tax and that pertain to the fair market value of gases for purpos-
224
es of the local gas severance tax. The legislation also treats all
agreements entered into on or after January 1, 2013, but prior to
July 1, 2014 as bona fide, valid and enforceable agreements.225
The legislature also amended Virginia Code section 58.1-3713 to
extend the sunset date to December 31, 2015 for the local gas
severance tax dedicated to the Gas Road Improvement Fund, the
Virginia Coalfield Economic Development Fund, and for water,
226
sewer, and gas lines.
220. Act of Apr. 6, 2014, ch. 737, 2014 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3660(A), -3661(B) (Cum. Supp. 2014)); Act of Mar. 17, 2014, ch. 259,
2014 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3660(A), -3661(B)
(Cum. Supp. 2014)).
221. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3660(B) (Supp. 2014).
222. Id. §§ 58.1-3660, -3661 (Repl. Vol. 2013).
223. Act of Mar. 5, 2014, ch. 179, 2014 Va. Acts -, (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3286, -3712 (Cum. Supp. 2014)); Act of Feb. 27, 2014, ch. 48, 2014 Va.
Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3286, -3712 (Cum. Supp.
2014)).
224. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3286, -3712 (Supp. 2014).
225. See id.
226. Act of Mar. 5, 2014, ch. 187, 2014 Va. Acts _, (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-3713(A), (C) (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
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2. Limited Nonprofit Exemption for Local Meals Tax and Food
and Beverage Tax
The 2014 General Assembly amended Virginia Code sections
58.1-3833 and 58.1-3840 to exempt nonprofit entities of fundrais-
er sales from paying county food and beverage taxes on the first
$100,000 in gross receipts per calendar year, beginning with the
fourth such sale in a calendar year.227 In order for the exemption
to apply, the legislation requires that the organization use gross
proceeds from such sales exclusively for nonprofit, educational,
charitable, benevolent, or religious purposes.228
3. Federal Credit Unions
The Chesapeake Circuit Court Clerk, the Honorable Faye W.
Mitchell, inquired about whether federal credit unions are ex-
empt from paying the recordation tax imposed upon grantees by
Virginia Code section 58.1-801 pursuant to the exemption provid-
ed by 12 U.S.C. § 1768.22 Under U.S.C. Chapter 14,
Federal credit unions, their property, their franchises, capital, re-
serves, surpluses, and other funds, and their income is exempt from
all taxation imposed by the United States or by any State . . . or local
taxing authority; except that any real property and any tangible per-
sonal property of such Federal credit unions shall be subject to Fed-
eral, State, . . . and local taxation to the same extent as other similar
230property is taxed.
The attorney general noted, "Congress therefore permits the tax-
ation of real or tangible personal property held by federal credit
unions to the extent similar property is taxed, but otherwise ex-
empts federal credit unions from 'all taxation' by state and local
governments."231 The attorney general went on to say that "'the
recordation tax is not a tax on property but on civil privilege',
[and] as such, the recordation tax does not fall within the bounds
227. Act of Apr. 6, 2014, ch. 673, 2014 Va. Acts , (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3833, 3840 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
228. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3833, 3840 (Supp. 2014).
229. Op. to Hon. Faye W. Mitchell 1 (Jan. 3, 2014), available at http://www.oag.state.
va.us (follow "Official Opinions" hyperlink; then follow "2014" hyperlink; then follow "Jan-
uary" hyperlink; then follow "13-105" hyperlink) [hereinafter Op. to 13-105].
230. 12 U.S.C. § 1768 (2012).
231. Op. 13-105, supra note 229, at 2.
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of the exception stated in 12 U.S.C. § 1768 that applies to state
and local taxation of federal credit unions' real and personal
property."232 Accordingly, the attorney general concluded that fed-
eral credit unions are exempt from paying the recordation tax
imposed on grantees by Virginia Code section 58.1-801.233
VI. BUSINESS, PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL LICENSE TAX
A. Recent Significant Legislation
The 2014 General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-3703.1 to permit a taxpayer to appeal to the State Tax
Commissioner or request a written ruling from him with regard
to the classification of the business for purposes of the BPOL tax,
regardless of whether the locality has conducted an audit, issued
an assessment, or taken any other action.234 Prior to this legisla-
tion, in order to appeal BPOL tax issues, taxpayers had to file an
application for review within the later of either one year from the
last day of the tax year for which an assessment is made or with-
in one year from the date of the appealable event.2 35
B. Recent Judicial Decisions
1. Ford Motor Credit Company v. Chesterfield County ("Ford
Motor Credit II")
On remand, two years after the Supreme Court of Virginia's
decision in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Chesterfield County, (Ford
Motor Credit 1),"' the Chesterfield County Circuit Court granted
Ford Motor Credit Company summary judgment on its proposed
apportionment method of BPOL gross receipts.237 In Ford Motor
Credit I, the supreme court addressed how a locality should im-
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Act of Feb. 27, 2014, ch. 27, 2014 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
235. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1(5)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
236. 281 Va. 321, 343, 707 S.E.2d 311, 323 (2011).
237. Letter Opinion, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Chesterfield Cnty., CL07000418-00 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Aug 9, 2013) (Chesterfield County) [hereinafter Ford Motor Credit II Letter Opin-
ion] (on file with author).
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pose the BPOL tax on gross receipts generated outside its geo-
graphical boundaries.23 8 In this case, the issue involved how Ches-
terfield County should tax interest earned on loans originating
from the Ford Motor Credit Company's regional office located
within the county where the taxpayer engaged in significant ac-
tivities outside of Virginia to collect the periodic interest pay-
ments earned on automobile loans.' Chesterfield County sought
to tax 100% of the interest earned on these loans.240 The supreme
court rejected this approach because evidence demonstrated that
it was not reasonable that all of the income generating activities
of the business occurred in Chesterfield County.2 4' Accordingly,
the supreme court held it appropriate to use payroll apportion-
ment to determine the revenues taxable to Chesterfield County
and remanded the case back to the circuit court.242
When the case returned to the Chesterfield County Circuit
Court for further proceedings, the court considered the argu-
ments made by both parties on the apportionment of the re-
ceipts.2 43 The court rejected Chesterfield County's argument that
the apportioned income base should be the total Virginia receipts
with a payroll factor reflecting only Richmond payroll and Virgin-
ia payroll.244 Rather, the court held that the receipts to be appor-
tioned are the total loans originated by the Chesterfield Office
multiplied by a payroll factor consisting of the Richmond branch
payroll as a numerator and the payroll of all offices that contrib-
uted to generating those receipts (including Richmond) as a de-
nominator.2 ' The court used total payroll, both direct and indi-
rect, noting that all parties agreed that the percentage difference
between the two would not be significant.246
With respect to the "out-of-state deduction" provided by Virgin-
ia Code section 58.1-3732B(2), the court followed a three-part
238. Ford Motor Credit I, 281 Va. at 326, 707 S.E.2d at 313.
239. Id. at 328, 339-40, 707 S.E.2d at 314, 321.
240. See id. at 339, 707 S.E.2d at 320-21.
241. See id. at 339-40, 707 S.E.2d at 321.
242. Id. at 328, 340, 707 S.E.2d at 314, 321.
243. Ford Motor Credit II, Letter Opinion, supra note 237 at 4-5, 7-9. For a complete
discussion of the Ford Motor Credit I decision by the Supreme Court of Virginia, see Craig
D. Bell, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Taxation, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 203, 236-41 (2011).
244. Ford Motor Credit II, Letter Opinion, supra note 237, at 5-6.
245. Id. at 9.
246. Id. at 8.
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test.247 First, it asked if any employees at the Richmond office par-
ticipated in interstate transactions. Second, it questioned wheth-
er the interstate participation can be tied to specific receipts.
Third, it stated that if specific tying is not possible, then the same
payroll factor must be applied. 4 ' The court held that the Rich-
mond employees participated in interstate transactions when
they sent the loans to offices in other states. The court then ap-
peared to agree with the taxpayer's expert that there could be no
specific tracing of the receipts.2 "o Before agreeing to utilize payroll
apportionment, however, the court required a further hearing to
determine "whether the Richmond branch receipts were actually
reported on any out-of-state tax returns."251
2. County Board of Arlington v. Nielsen Co.
In County Board of Arlington v. Nielsen Co., the Arlington
County Circuit Court addressed the issue of how the Nielsen
Company ("Nielsen") should apportion its receipts to Arlington
County for its multi-state operations with over 100 offices, includ-
ing one in the county, when use of payroll apportionment is re-
quired. 2 Specifically, the court addressed how to compute Virgin-
ia Code section 58.1-3732(B)(2) deductions from gross receipts.
Nielsen filed a BPOL tax return with Arlington County for the
2542007 tax year. Nielsen used payroll apportionment to situs a
share of its gross receipts to its Arlington office for purposes of
that return.255 It also used payroll apportionment to compute its
247. Id. at 9.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 10.
250. Id. at 10-11.
251. Id. at 11.
252. Letter Opinion, No. CL12-2872 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 19, 2013) (Arlington County)
[hereinafter Nielsen, Letter Opinion] (on file with author).
253. Id. at 2.
254. VA. DEP'T OF TAXATION, PUB. DOC. 12-146 (Aug. 31, 2013), available at http://
www.policylibrary.tax.virginia.gov/OTP/policy.nsf (follow "Rulings of the Tax Commission-
er" hyperlink; then follow "2012" hyperlink; then follow "PD 12-146" hyperlink) [hereinaf-
ter PUB. DOC. 12-146].
255. Id.
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deductions for receipts attributable to business in other states
216
where Nielsen is subject to income tax.
Arlington County audited Nielsen's BPOL return and, through
its Commissioner of Revenue, issued an assessment that in-
creased Nielsen's taxable gross receipts.257 The county agreed with
Nielsen's use of payroll apportionment to situs gross receipts."'
However, the county disagreed with Nielsen's methodology for
the deduction and therefore reduced Nielsen's deduction by sev-
eral million dollars.' Nielsen filed an administrative appeal with
the county challenging the assessment.26 The Commissioner of
Revenue upheld her assessment.26 1
Nielsen appealed to the State Tax Commissioner pursuant to
Virginia Code section 58.1-3703.1(A)(6).26 2 The State Tax Com-
missioner held that Nielsen's computation of the deduction to be
correct so long as its Arlington office helped generate the out-of-
state receipts and that situsing Nielsen's gross receipts by means
other than payroll apportionment is impractical.26 3 The State Tax
Commissioner directed the county to determine whether those
conditions were satisfied and, if so, to revise the assessment.
The county did not make those determinations or revise its
assessment as the State Tax Commissioner directed. The county
instead appealed to the Arlington County Circuit Court, pursuant
to Virginia Code section 58.1-3703.1(A)(7).265
The parties stipulated to a large portion of the evidence pre-
sented at trial.266 The stipulations submitted during the trial es-
tablished that Nielsen is a multi-state company that advises cli-
256. Id.
257. Id. at 2.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1-2.
261. Id. at 3.
262. Id. at 1-2.
263. Id. at 3.
264. Id.
265. Transcript of Proceedings at 29-30, Cnty. Bd. of Arlington v. Nielsen Co., LLC,
No. CL12-2872 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 16, 2013) (Arlington County) [hereinafter Nielsen Tran-
script] (on file with author).
266. Joint Stipulations, Cnty. Bd. of Arlington v. Nielsen Co., LLC, No. CL12-2872 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Oct. 16, 2013) (Arlington County) [hereinafter Joint Stipulations] (on file with au-
thor).
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ents about consumer buying habits. 267 During 2006-the relevant
year for purposes of computing the BPOL tax for Nielsen's 2007
return-Nielsen had over 100 offices in eighteen states, of which
the Arlington County office was the only office in Virginia.26 ' Niel-
sen's gross receipts in 2006 totaled $100,638,735.'6' The receipts
from customers in Virginia totaled $2,456,460, less than 2.5% of
Nielsen's total gross receipts.2 70
All of Nielsen's offices work together in an integrated manner
to generate its gross receipts. This includes the Arlington office,
which supports Nielsen's nationwide business through such ser-
vices as data collection, solicitation of sales, and client support.2 H
The parties stipulated that, because of the integrated nature of
Nielsen's business, it is impractical or impossible to attribute
Nielsen's gross receipts to particular places of business. 272 Nielsen
argued that Virginia Code section 58.1-3703.1(A)(3)(b) required it
to use payroll apportionment to situs a share of its gross receipts
to its Arlington office for purposes of the BPOL tax.272
In 2006, the Arlington office constituted 23.8668% of Nielsen's
total payroll.274 Accordingly, 23.8668% of Nielsen's gross receipts,
or $24,019,248,275 was initially apportioned to the Arlington office.
This large amount was sitused to Arlington even though only $2.4
million was earned from clients in Virginia.276
Nielsen filed income tax returns in Virginia and eleven other
states for 2006.277 Nielsen's receipts attributable to business in
those eleven states totaled $54,352,536.27' Nielsen determined the
amount of those receipts apportioned to its Arlington office
by applying the Arlington payroll factor to that sum, thereby
267. Id. at 3.
268. Id. at 1 4-5; PUB. Doc. 12-146, supra note 254, at 1.
269. Joint Stipulations, supra note 266, at 4.
270. Id. at I 3-4.
271. Id. at 1 8.
272. Id. at 1.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 3.
275. This value is calculated by multiplying $100,638,735 (Nielsen's gross receipts in
2006) by 23.8668% (the Arlington office's percentage of Nielsen's total payroll).
276. Id. at 1, 4.
277. Id. at T 5.
278. Id. at T 4.
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yielding a deduction of $12,972,21327" and reducing total taxable
gross receipts in Arlington to $11,047,034).280
The county disputed Nielsen's methodology for the deduction
and maintained that the deduction was not properly determined
by applying the Arlington payroll factor to all of Nielsen's receipts
attributable to business in the eleven other taxing states. Rather,
the county maintained before the trial court that the Arlington
payroll factor can be applied only to the difference between the
receipts generated in those states and the sum that would be fic-
tionally assigned to them under the payroll apportionment formu-
la.281
The court rejected the State Tax Commissioner's ruling and
state-wide policy and reinstated Arlington County's assessment.
The court appeared unpleased with the lack of analysis or expla-
nation in the State Tax Commissioner's ruling on how the payroll
apportionment should work and further found that the State Tax
Commissioner's ruling was contrary to the law governing BPOL
deductions."' While the court recognized that Virginia Code sec-
tion 58.1-3732 clearly allows for the "exemption," it stated that
Nielsen presented no evidence of "what that exemption should be
other than proffer that it should be the payroll percentage applied
to the out-of-state taxable gross receipts."284 The court concluded
that the August 31, 2012 State Tax Commissioner decision was
"erroneous, contrary to law and precedent and is arbitrary and
*,,9285capricious in its application.
Nielsen filed a Petition for Appeal with the Supreme Court of
Virginia. On June 4, 2014, the supreme court awarded an appeal
to Nielsen.286
279. This value is calculated by multiplying $54,352,536 (Nielsen's receipts attributa-
ble to business in the eleven other states in 2006) by 23.8668% (the Arlington office's per-
centage of Nielsen's total payroll).
280. The $11,047,034 value is calculated by subtracting $12,972,213 (the value calcu-
lated in note 273) from $24,019,248 (the value calculated in note 270).
281. Nielsen Transcript, supra note 265, at 12.
282. Nielsen Letter Opinion, supra note 252, at 5.
283. Id. at 4-5.
284. Id. at 4.
285. Id. at 5.
286. Order, Nielsen Co. v. Cnty. Board of Arlington, Virginia Supreme Court Record
No. 140422 (June 4, 2014) (on file with author).
210 [Vol. 49:171
